The­re are two com­pe­ting theo­ries explai­ning bank panics. One argues that panics are dri­ven by real shocks, asym­me­tric infor­ma­ti­on, and con­cerns about insol­ven­cy. The other theo­ry argues that bank runs are self-ful­fil­ling, dri­ven by illi­qui­di­ty and the beliefs of depo­si­tors. This paper tests pre­dic­tions of the­se two theo­ries using infor­ma­ti­on uni­que­ly available for the Panic of 1893. The results sug­gest that real eco­no­mic shocks were important deter­mi­nants of the loca­ti­on of panics at the natio­nal level, howe­ver at the local level, both insol­ven­cy and illi­qui­di­ty were important as trig­gers of bank panics.

Quel­le /​ Link: Cau­ses of Bank Sus­pen­si­ons in the Panic of 1893